criteria, either imposing these criteria as constraints to social welfare function (SWF) maximization problems, or directly incorporating these criteria in the functional form of the SWF. Our framework provides a clearer view of the obstacles policy analysts face, and enables us to discuss directions for future research in normative policy analysis.
Welfarism, the Constraints of Policy, and the Constraints of Policy Analysis
Government can influence an economic system in many ways. Alternative government actions imply alternative outcomes for individuals and hence society. The goal of normative policy analysis is to obtain a social ordering of these alternative actions. A basic value judgment criterion (VJC) commonly assumed in normative policy analysis is welfarism (Sen, 1977) , defined as (VJC.1)
The ranking of social states depends solely on the welfare of individuals. .
No additional information (about individual liberty, for example) is needed to rank policy outcomes. Social values, such as liberty, count because of the contribution they make to individual welfare. Though not undisputed, this basic value judgment criterion is widely agreed upon among economists.
Following this welfaristic view of society, normative policy analysis is frequently conducted by modeling government as having some number m policy instruments to create, destroy, or redistribute welfare among some number n individuals (Bullock, 1994) . Formally, let x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) be a vector of policy instrument variables available to government. For example, policy instrument variable x 1 could be an import tariff, x 2 a production subsidy, x 3 an environmental regulation, etc. Each of these policy instrument variables can take on different specific values, and we denote a specific policy instrument value with a superscript, e.g. x 1 A is an import tariff of $0.25 per unit, x 2 A is a production subsidy of $0.50 per unit, etc. If a policy instrument is not used by government we denote it by superscript 0, e.g. x 1 0 is an import tariff of $0.00 per unit. A specific government policy is described by the values of all available policy instruments, e.g. . One policy often of interest is "nonintervention," here denoted by x 0 = (x 1 0 , x 2 0 , . . . , x m 0 ), which is the policy of simply not using any of the available instruments.
Each government policy affects the welfare of some number n individuals, as described by the vector u = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n ). In the extreme case n is the number of people in society.
For tractability and/or because interest groups are often assumed to play an important role in the social decision making process, policy analysts usually aggregate individuals into groups.
The agricultural economics literature has often focused on the welfare of farmers, which we denote u 1 . We use u 2 , . . . , u n to denote the welfare of interest groups of nonfarmers, e.g.
consumers, taxpayers, input suppliers, etc. Different policies imply different welfare levels (policy outcomes) for interest groups and society, e. g. Assuming modeled market conditions are described by b', that some specific policy x A = (x 1 A , .
. . , x m A ) is considered, and that some specific welfare measure h( ) is used, a specific modeled
can be obtained.
Government's ability to create, destroy and redistribute welfare is also limited since government can choose only from a limited set of policies, for not all values of x are technically feasible. It makes little sense, for instance, to think about a negative import quota, or about a per-unit production subsidy greater than the gross domestic product. Given some vector of policy instruments x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) modeled as available, we will denote X R m as the model's set of technically feasible policies.
2 Often an analyst does not consider the effects of all the policies in his or her model's set of technically feasible policies. We will denote the set of examined policies as X , where of course X X.
The examination of how government is technically constrained in the creation, destruction, and redistribution of economic welfare has been of primary interest to normative agricultural policy analysts over the last forty years. Welfarism implies that to conduct such an examination, it is necessary to find for each policy in the set of examined polices X the values of the h(x, b) vector of functions, which describes how policy affects interest group welfare.
Therefore all studies conducting such examinations have faced three challenges: (i) to define and estimate the parameters b of a model of economic markets; (ii) to obtain a welfare measure h( ); and (iii) to choose a set of policies to be examined, X . Challenge (i) above is of course the focus of the study of econometrics, and (ii) is the focus of applied welfare economics. Here we focus on (iii) to discuss how the agricultural economics literature covering the effects of government policy on welfare has developed largely by broadening X , the set of examined policies.
Finding the welfare effects of a policy: mapping from policy space to interest group welfare space
The simplest case: mapping when X' is discrete
The basic framework most often used in the economics literature to map from policy space to interest group welfare space follows the pioneering work of Marshall. This basic framework uses an econometrically estimated model of agricultural markets to obtain b, and then examines a set of policies X which is discrete, for example X = {x We will call policies like x A and x B that use only one instrument simple policies. We will call
policies like x C that use multiple instruments simultaneously combined policies. some additional value judgment criteria described later, it is possible to obtain a social preference ordering of such a discrete set of examined policies. as will be discussed later.
Broadening the set of examined policies: X' continuous
In general, a model's set of technically feasible policies X is continuous, meaning that if a policy (x 1 A , . . . , x n A ) can be imposed, then so can some (x 1 A + e 1 , . . . , x n A + e n ), where e 1 , . . . , e n are arbitrarily small numbers in absolute value. Recognizing that when X is discrete only a very partial view of what is technically feasible for government is provided, Josling (1974) observed that by continuously changing the level of the instrument of a simple policy a curve could be mapped in interest group welfare space and thus provide a broader picture of how government is constrained in creating, destroying, or redistributing welfare using a single policy instrument. Gardner (1983) took up Josling's basic idea and presented it in a more systematic framework, calling Josling's curves surplus transformation curves (STCs).
The mapping procedure which produces Josling-Gardner surplus transformation curves available policy instrument x 1 only. Studies using this framework are for example Just, Gardner (1983 , and de Gorter, Nielson, and Rausser.
Bullock (1992) followed Gardner's (1983) approach to show how multiple surplus transformation curves can be combined to study the welfare effects of combined policies.
Bullock's procedure is illustrated in figure (Bullock, 1995 (Bullock, , p. 1239 . Following Bullock (1994) F(b) is defined as
Note that sets of simple policies, such as line segments ec and ed, are subsets of X.
Since the STCs result from mapping subsets of X onto interest group welfare space, then the STCs must be contained in F(b). Note also that many technically feasible policy outcomes, such as at point G, can only be obtained by way of combined policies.
The Pareto Principle and Pareto Efficiency
Having analyzed government's abilities to influence the social state, and given the basic value judgment criterion of welfarism, we can discuss how to rank feasible policies using additional value judgment criteria. A value judgment criterion commonly accepted among economists is 
where u pre is the predetermined level of farm welfare. As the authors note (footnote 7, p.
1002), their approach may be thought of as a procedure for defining an "efficient surplus transformation curve" (a Pareto frontier) for a given set of available policy instruments. In a similar analysis, Salhofer found Pareto efficient policies by minimizing social costs (which is equivalent to maximizing social welfare) subject to a given change of producer welfare. Unlike Alston, Carter, and Smith , Salhofer developed and presented an STC-type diagram in interest group welfare space. Bullock (1991 Bullock ( , 1996 developed a technique for finding Pareto efficient policies and policy outcomes on the Pareto frontier for the general m-policy instrument, n-interest group model. Bullock (1991) formally proved that a policy x * is Pareto efficient if and only if it solves simultaneously the n constrained maximization problems: . . , n; j 1, 2, . . . , n; j i (3) Bullock (1994 Bullock ( , 1996 briefly discussed how the envelope theorem implies that the Pareto frontier envelopes all Josling-Gardner surplus transformation curves, and how at points along the Pareto frontier all surplus transformation curves are tangent to a common hyperplane. , for at least one j {1, 2, . . . , n}. To obtain a complete social preference ordering of X, additional value judgment criteria must be employed. There is little doubt that human behavior is affected by equity considerations (Sen, 1987 (Sen, , 1992 In applied work the most common specific functional form of a Bergson While the utilitarian value judgment criterion (VJC.3-1), completes the social preference ordering of policies, ranking policy options by summing welfare levels is based on the assumption that increasing the welfare of a wealthy person by one unit is of equal social value as is increasing the welfare of a poor person by one unit. Hence, (VJC.3-1) has been criticized by many notable agricultural economists over a long period of time for failing to consider distributive equity (Nerlove; Josling, 1974; Rausser; Gardner, 1983; Just 
Putting constraints on an SWF to implement equity considerations
Nerlove and Wallace were among the first to use welfare economics to assess agricultural policies. Also, because they were partly dissatisfied with (VJC.3-1), they were the first to depart from the utilitarian value judgment criterion. Nerlove wrote (p. 223): "If we take as an axiom that government programs are designed to benefit the producer, the benefit to producers resulting from a program becomes an important magnitude." Nerlove and Wallace first tried to capture this by fixing the instrument levels so that all examined policies guaranteed the same predetermined "fair" producer price level (or equally, the same increase in price level compared to the nonintervention price). So, the social decision making problem underlying their work can be represented as finding a policy x * which meets the following set of value judgment criteria:
results in a predetermined "fair" price .
Thus, Nerlove and Wallace's method implied the assumption of a Benthamite SWF maximized subject to the distributive equity constraint that a predetermined "fair" price be achieved.
Wallace (p. 586) recognized that the predetermined "fair" price value judgment criterion may be misleading if the goal of a policy is to increase total farm revenue. Hence in essence he suggested the use of a predetermined level of total farm revenue (or equally changes in total farm revenue) as a value judgment criterion to replace the predetermined price value judgment criterion. In the last part of his paper Wallace argued that " Examples of studies using (VJC.3-3a) with i = 1 are Josling (1974) , Alston and Hurd, de Gorter and Meilke, Alston, Carter, and Smith, Gisser, de Gorter and Swinnen, Moschini and Sckokai, and Salhofer. Josling (1974, p. 245 ) also discussed a predetermined consumer welfare level value judgment criterion--the case where i in (VJC.3-3a) represents consumers.
When n -1 of the n welfare levels are predetermined, the same ranking is derived when these predetermined welfare levels are combined with the Pareto principle instead of with an SWF. Hence, we could have equivalently described (VJC.3-3a) as 
and called a policy preferable to another if the former has lower RSC given a predetermined "fair" price. Josling (1969) and Dardis and Dennison first compared policies using RSC combined with the more appropriate constraint of a predetermined farm welfare. As with the SC value judgment criterion, it is easily shown that minimizing the RSC implies the same social preference ordering as does maximizing the SWF: W(u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n ) = (u 1 + u 2 + . . . + u n -E)/(u 1 -u 1 0 ). So, this social decision making problem can be represented as finding a policy x , where in Josling and Gardner's case i = farmers and j = nonfarmers. With this set of value judgment criteria they sought to find the highest attainable point on a fixed ray through the origin (such as at u F in figure 3 ).
Placing distributive equity considerations directly into the SWF
Just showed that (VJC.3-4a) can also be represented by an SWF with right-angled SICs ( figure   3 ). Such an SWF can be expressed by a Leontief-type function. The value judgment criteria (VJC.3-4a) can also be expressed as finding a policy x * such that
where i / j = r pre is the welfare distribution ratio between group i and group j. If the welfare ratio r pre = 1 for all i, j, then (VJC.3-4b) is the Rawlsian maximin criterion (Tuomala) . Dardis (1967a Dardis ( , 1967b Other applications of (VJC.3-6) were performed by Gardner (1985 Gardner ( , 1988 Gardner ( , 1991 Gardner ( , 1992 Gardner ( , 1995 , Innes and Rausser, Innes, and de Gorter, Nielson, and Rausser.
Concluding Comments
We have presented a welfaristic analytical framework with which the normative policy analysis literature can be more easily understood and discussed. We have used our framework to review the development of the normative agricultural policy analysis literature, and we have shown that that development has unfolded as agricultural economists have gradually expanded X , the set of examined policies. The literature has gone from examining a very small set of simple policies to a much broader set of policies that combine policy instruments simultaneously.
Following Josling (1974) we recommend that normative analysis be discussed in interest group welfare space, where it is convenient to show what government can and cannot do in creating, destroying, or redistributing welfare. The development of the normative policy analysis literature has been based on interest group welfare space over the past twenty-five years..
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The literature's gradual expansion of the set of examined policies has led to a corresponding gradual expansion of the examined feasible set of policy outcomes, from welfare outcomes of a few specific policies, to Josling-Gardner surplus transformation curves, to multidimensional submanifolds of feasible policy outcomes and corresponding Pareto frontiers.
Given that government's constraints implied by the feasible set of policy outcomes are understood, it is natural next to discuss policy objectives. Pareto efficiency and distributive equity often have been proposed as policy objectives in the literature. While Pareto efficiency is a commonly accepted value judgment criterion, different methods have been used to take into account distributive equity. Since redistribution has always been a central theme in the study of agricultural policy, agricultural economists partly departed from the traditional utilitarian value judgment criterion of minimizing social costs, and tried to incorporate equity considerations. While at a glance it may seem that many different methods have been used to consider distributive equity, we show that in general all these methods can be traced back to three alternative methods consistent with welfarism and Pareto efficiency: (i) maximizing a utilitarian SWF subject to predetermined welfare levels of interest groups; (ii) maximizing a utilitarian SWF subject to predetermined welfare ratios of interest groups (or, equivalently, maximizing a Leontief-type SWF); (iii) maximizing a weighted linear SWF. In many studies, the value judgment criteria are not immediately obvious. We argue that researchers should state straight-forwardly their value judgment criteria, in the form of an SWF with or without constraints.
We advocate a more statistical analysis of policy as a primary direction for further (Kling and Sexton; Bullock (1995); Jeong, Bullock, and Garcia, 1996a , 1996b , 1996c .
1
We discuss only how government is constrained by economic market realities, not politics.
2
Technically feasible policies need not be politically infeasible (Bullock 1994 , footnote 3).
3
Various studies in normative policy analysis try to evaluate the social costs of a policy. In terms of our framework these papers compare the nonintervention policy x 0 to an actual or hypothetical government interventionary policy, e.g. x A . 4 For ease of notation throughout the rest of the paper, we do not place a superscript on b, but still assume that it is a vector of constant numbers rather than a vector of variables.
5
For example, say that supply and can be described as S(P, b) = k 1 + k 2 P and D(P, b) = k 3 + k 4 P, where the market parameters are k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , and k 4 , and so b = (k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , k 4 ). Then using geometric areas in figure 1 to measure the welfare of producers and consumer-taxpayers, 
Other early applications include Johnson, Tintner and Patel, Dardis (1967a, 1967b) , Welch, Peterson, Schmitz and Seckler, and Hushak. 7 Techniques of estimating the welfare effects h( ) and normative policy analysis today are sometimes based on more sophisticated models taking into account multimarket effects Just, Hueth, and Schmitz; Thurman and Wohlgenant; Bullock, 1993; Thurman; Brännlund and Kriström) ; or noncompetitive market structure (Just, Schmitz, and Zilberman; Wong; McCorriston and Sheldon; Peterson and Connor) ; or the presence of risk and uncertainty Konandreas and Schmitz; Wright; Helms; Larson, 1988; Fraser; Bullock, Garcia, and Lee) . Though there exist other techniques for obtaining a welfare measure h( ) that do not calculate areas behind demand and supply curves (for example by using duality theory (Chipman and Moore; McKenzie; Cornes; Martin and Alston) , using geometric areas is still most common among agricultural economists (Alston and Larson) . The importance of Josling's simple idea of mapping the policy outcomes into interest group welfare space is just recently being appreciated: "His 'framework' has in many ways become the 'dominant paradigm' in which [agricultural] policy is discussed" and "still echoes through the subsequent literature" (Peters, p. xix). 9 Note that at nonintervention policy (x 1 0 , x 2 0 ) shown by point e in figure 2 is not (0, 0). This is because under nonintervention production quota is a positive number: x 2 0 > 0. That is, the quota is set high enough to be nonbinding, such that producers produce as much as they want. 10 Bullock and Salhofer proved that Bullock's (1991 Bullock's ( , 1996 method of solving n constrained optimization problems simultaneously is equivalent to simpler methods proposed by Alston, Carter, Smith, and Salhofer of solving a single constrained maximization problem only if the solution to their problem is unique.
11
In the orthodox theory of economic policy (Tinbergen; Theil), social welfare is a function of economic indicators, such as the rate of economic growth, the rate of employment, a satisfactory external trade balance, etc. However, such targets are not themselves ends but are only indicators of policy success.
The ends of policy are to influence the welfare of individuals, and hence our framework covers the "orthodox" view. In the case of agriculture, officially stated policy objectives are manifold, such as "to promote agricultural efficiency and the optimum utilization of factors of production," "to assure a fair farmer income," "to maintain vigorous and pleasant rural communities" or "to conserve the natural environment" (Winters, p. 291) . Again, such objectives are desirable because they contribute to individual well-being. 
